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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to tolerate
“brain damage”: cumulative changes to the network’s parame-
ters (e.g., pruning, numerical perturbations) typically result in
a graceful degradation of classification accuracy. However, the
limits of this natural resilience are not well understood in the
presence of small adversarial changes to the DNN parameters’
underlying memory representation, such as bit-flips that may
be induced by hardware fault attacks. We study the effects of
bitwise corruptions on 19 DNN models—six architectures on
three image classification tasks—and we show that most mod-
els have at least one parameter that, after a specific bit-flip in
their bitwise representation, causes an accuracy loss of over
90%. We employ simple heuristics to efficiently identify the
parameters likely to be vulnerable. We estimate that 40–50%
of the parameters in a model might lead to an accuracy drop
greater than 10% when individually subjected to such single-
bit perturbations. To demonstrate how an adversary could
take advantage of this vulnerability, we study the impact of
an exemplary hardware fault attack, Rowhammer, on DNNs.
Specifically, we show that a Rowhammer-enabled attacker
co-located in the same physical machine can inflict significant
accuracy drops (up to 99%) even with single bit-flip corrup-
tions and no knowledge of the model. Our results expose the
limits of DNNs’ resilience against parameter perturbations in-
duced by real-world fault attacks. We conclude by discussing
possible mitigations and future research directions towards
fault attack-resilient DNNs.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be resilient to
“brain damage” [32]: typically, cumulative changes to the net-
work’s parameters result in a graceful degradation of classifi-
cation accuracy. This property has been harnessed in a broad
range of techniques, such as network pruning [35], which
significantly reduces the number of parameters in the network
and leads to improved inference times. Besides structural re-
silience, DNN models can tolerate slight noise in their parame-
ters with minimal accuracy degradation [2]. Researchers have
proposed utilizing this property in defensive techniques, such
as adding Gaussian noise to model parameters to strengthen
DNN models against adversarial examples [69]. As a result,
this natural resilience is believed to make it difficult for attack-
ers to significantly degrade the overall accuracy by corrupting
network parameters.
Recent work has explored the impact of hardware faults on
DNN models [34,42,45]. Such faults can corrupt the memory
storing the victim model’s parameters, stress-testing DNNs’
resilience to bitwise corruptions. For example, Qin et al. [42],
confirming speculation from previous studies [34,35], showed
that a DNN model for CIFAR10 image classification does
not lose more than 5% accuracy when as many as 2,600 pa-
rameters out of 2.5 million are corrupted by random errors.
However, this analysis is limited to a specific scenario and
only considers accidental errors rather than attacker-induced
corruptions by means of fault attacks. The widespread us-
age of DNNs in many mission-critical systems, such as self-
driving cars or aviation [12, 51], requires a comprehensive
understanding of the security implications of such adversarial
bitwise errors.
In this paper, we explore the security properties of DNNs
under bitwise errors that can be induced by practical hardware
fault attacks. Specifically, we ask the question: How vulnera-
ble are DNNs to the atomic corruption that a hardware fault
attacker can induce? This paper focuses on single bit-flip
attacks that are realistic as they well-approximate the con-
strained memory corruption primitive of practical hardware
fault attacks such as Rowhammer [48]. To answer this ques-
tion, we conduct a comprehensive study that characterizes the
DNN model’s responses to single-bit corruptions in each of
its parameters.
First, we implement a systematic vulnerability analysis
framework that flips each bit in a given model’s parameters
and measures the misclassification rates on a validation set.
Using our framework, we analyze 19 DNN models; consist-
ing of six different architectures and their variants on three
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popular image classification tasks—MNIST, CIFAR10, and
ImageNet. Our experiments show that, on average, ∼50% of
model parameters are vulnerable to single bit-flip corruptions,
causing relative accuracy drops above 10%. Further, all 19
DNN models contain parameters that can cause an accuracy
drop of over 90%1. These show that adversarial bitwise errors
can lead to a graceless degradation of classification accuracy;
exposing the limits of DNNs’ resilience to numerical changes.
Our framework also allows us to characterize the vulner-
ability by examining the impact of various factors: the bit
position, bit-flip direction, parameter sign, layer width, acti-
vation function, normalization and model architecture. Our
key findings include: 1) the vulnerability is caused by drastic
spikes in a parameter’s value; 2) the spikes in positive param-
eters are more threatening, however, an activation function
that allows negative outputs renders the negative parameters
vulnerable as well; 3) the number of vulnerable parameters in-
creases proportionally as the DNN’s layers get wider; 4) two
common training techniques, e.g., dropout [52] and batch
normalization [24], are ineffective in preventing the massive
spikes bit-flips cause; and 5) the ratio of vulnerable param-
eters is almost constant across different architectures (e.g.,
AlexNet, VGG16, and so on). Further, building on these find-
ings, we propose heuristics for speeding up the analysis of
vulnerable parameters in large models.
Second, to understand the practical impact of this vulner-
ability, we use Rowhammer [26] as an exemplary hardware
fault attack. While a variety of hardware fault attacks are doc-
umented in literature [11, 26, 38, 57], Rowhammer is particu-
larly amenable to practical, real-world exploitation. Rowham-
mer takes advantage of a widespread vulnerability in modern
DRAM modules and provides an attacker with the ability to
trigger controlled memory corruptions directly from unpriv-
ileged software execution. As a result, even a constrained
Rowhammer-enabled attacker, who only needs to perform a
specific memory access pattern, can mount practical attacks in
a variety of real-world environments, including cloud [44,67],
browsers [9, 15, 19, 48], mobile [15, 62], and servers [36, 60].
We analyze the feasibility of Rowhammer attacks on DNNs
by simulating a Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) sce-
nario, where the victim and attacker VMs are co-located on
the same host machine in the cloud. The co-location causes
the victim and the attacker to share the same physical memory,
enabling the attacker to trigger Rowhammer bit-flips in the
victim’s data [44, 67]. We focus our analysis on models with
an applicable memory footprint, which can realistically be
targeted by hardware fault attacks such as Rowhammer.
Our Rowhammer results show that in a surgical attack sce-
nario, with the capability of flipping specific bits, the attacker
can reliably cause severe accuracy drops in practical settings.
Further, even in a blind attack scenario, the attacker can still
1The vulnerability of a parameter requires a specific bit in its bitwise rep-
resentation to be flipped. There also might be multiple such bits in the
representation that, when flipped separately, trigger the vulnerability.
mount successful attacks without any control over the memory
locations of the bit-flips. Moreover, we also reveal a potential
vulnerability in the transfer learning scenario; in which a sur-
gical attack targets the parameters in the layers victim model
contains in common with a public one.
Lastly, we discuss directions for viable protection mecha-
nisms, such as reducing the number of vulnerable parameters
by preventing significant changes in a parameter value. In
particular, this can be done by 1) restricting activation magni-
tudes and 2) using low-precision numbers for model parame-
ters via quantization or binarization. We show that, when we
restrict the activations using the ReLU6 activation function,
the ratio of vulnerable parameters decreases from 47% to
3% in AlexNet, and also, the accuracy drops are largely con-
tained within 10%. Moreover, quantization and binarization
reduce the vulnerable parameter ratio from 50% to 1-2% in
MNIST. While promising, such solutions cannot deter prac-
tical hardware fault attacks in the general case, and often
require training the victim model from scratch; hinting that
more research is required towards fault attack-resilient DNNs.
Contributions. We make three contributions:
• We show DNN models are more vulnerable to bit-flip
corruptions than previously assumed. In particular, we
show adversarial bitwise corruptions induced by hard-
ware fault attacks can easily inflict severe indiscriminate
damage by drastically increasing or decreasing the value
of a model parameter.
• We conduct the first comprehensive analysis of DNN
models’ behavior against single bit-flips and characterize
the vulnerability that a hardware fault attack can trigger.
• Based on our analysis, we study the impact of practical
hardware fault attacks in a representative DL scenario.
Our analysis shows that a Rowhammer-enabled attacker
can inflict significant accuracy drops (up to 99%) on a
victim model even with constrained bit-flip corruptions
and no knowledge of the model.
2 Preliminaries
Here, we provide an overview of the required background
knowledge.
Deep neural networks. A DNN can be conceptualized as
a function that takes an input and returns a prediction, i.e.,
the inferred label of the input instance. The network is com-
posed of a sequence of layers that is individually parame-
terized by a set of matrices, or weights. Our work focuses
on feed-forward DNNs—specifically on convolutional neural
networks (CNNs)—in the supervised learning setting, i.e., the
weights that minimize the inference error are learned from
a labeled training set. In a feed-forward network, each layer
applies a linear transformation, defined by its weight matrix,
to its input—the output of the previous layer—and a bias
parameter is added optionally. After the linear transformation,
a non-linear activation function is applied; as well as other
optional layer structures, such as dropout, pooling or batch
normalization. During training, the DNN’s parameters, i.e.,
the weights in each layer and in other optional structures,
are updated iteratively by backpropagating the error on the
training data. Once the network converges to an acceptable
error rate or when it goes through sufficient iterations, training
stops and the network, along with all its parameters, is stored
as a trained network. During testing (or inference), we load
the full model into the memory and produce the prediction
for a given input instance, usually not in the training data.
Single precision floating point numbers. The parameters
of a DNN model are usually represented as IEEE754 32-bit
single-precision floating-point numbers. This format lever-
ages the exponential notation and trades off the large range
of possible values for reduced precision. For instance, the
number 0.15625 in exponential notation is represented as
1.25×2−3. Here, 1.25 expresses the mantissa; whereas −3
is the exponent. The IEEE754 single-precision floating-point
format defines 23 bits to store the mantissa, 8 bits for the
exponent, and one bit for the sign of the value. The fact that
different bits have different influence on the represented value
makes this format interesting from an adversarial perspective.
For instance, continuing or example, flipping the 16th bit in
the mantissa increases the value from 0.15625 to 0.15625828;
hence, a usually negligible perturbation. On the other hand,
a flipping the highest exponent bit would turn the value into
1.25×2125. Although both of these rely on the same bit cor-
ruption primitive, they yield vastly different results. In Sec 4,
we analyze how this might lead to a vulnerability when a
DNN’s parameters are corrupted via single bit-flips.
Rowhammer attacks. Rowhammer is the most common
instance of software-induced fault attacks [9, 15, 19, 44, 48,
60, 62, 67]. This vulnerability provides an aggressor with a
single-bit corruption primitive at DRAM level; thus, it is an
ideal attack for the purpose of our analysis. Rowhammer is
a remarkably versatile fault attack since it only requires an
attacker to be able to access content in DRAM; an ubiqui-
tous feature of every modern system. By simply carrying
out specific memory access patterns—which we explain in
Sec 5—the attacker is able to cause extreme stress on other
memory locations triggering faults on other stored data.
3 Threat Model
Prior research has extensively validated a DNN’s resilience
to parameter changes [2, 32, 34, 35, 42, 69], by considering
random or deliberate perturbations. However, from a security
perspective, these results provide only limited insights as they
study a network’s expected performance under cumulative
changes. In contrast, towards a successful and feasible attack,
an adversary is usually interested in inflicting the worst-case
damage under minimal changes.
We consider a class of modifications that an adversary, us-
ing hardware fault attacks, can induce in practice. We assume
a cloud environment where the victim’s deep learning sys-
tem is deployed inside a VM—or a container—to serve the
requests of external users. For making test-time inferences,
the trained DNN model and its parameters are loaded into
the system’s (shared) memory and remain constant in normal
operation. Recent studies describe this as a typical scenario
in MLaaS [61].
To understand the DNNs’ vulnerability in this setting, we
consider the atomic change that an adversary may induce—
the single bit-flip—and we, in Sec 4, systematically charac-
terize the damage such change may cause. We then, in Sec 5,
investigate the feasibility of inducing this damage in prac-
tice, by considering adversaries with different capabilities and
levels of knowledge.
Capabilities. We consider an attacker co-located in the
same physical host machine as the victim’s deep learning
system. The attacker, due to co-location, can take advan-
tage of a well-known software-induced fault attack, Rowham-
mer [44,67], for corrupting the victim model stored in DRAM.
We take into account two possible scenarios: 1) a surgical
attack scenario where the attacker can cause a bit-flip at an
intended location in the victim’s process memory by lever-
aging advanced memory massaging primitives [44, 62] to
obtain more precise results; and 2) a blind attack where the
attacker lacks fine-grained control over the bit-flips; thus, is
completely unaware of where a bit-flip lands in the layout of
the model.
Knowledge. Using the existing terminology, we consider
two levels for the attacker’s knowledge of the victim model,
e.g., the model’s architecture and its parameters as well as
their placement in memory: 1) a black-box setting where the
attacker has no knowledge of the victim model. Here, both
the surgical and blind attackers only hope to trigger an accu-
racy drop as they cannot anticipate what the impact of their
bit-flips would be; and 2) a white-box setting where the at-
tacker knows the victim model, at least partially. Here, the
surgical attacker can deliberately tune the attack’s inflicted ac-
curacy drop—from minor to catastrophic damage. Optionally,
the attacker can force the victim model to misclassify a spe-
cific input sample without significantly damaging the overall
accuracy. However, the blind attacker gains no significant ad-
vantage over the black-box scenario as the lack of capability
prevents the attacker from acting on the knowledge.
4 Single-Bit Corruptions on DNNs
In this section, we expose DNNs’ vulnerability to single bit-
flips. We start with an overview of our experimental setup
and methodology. We then present our findings on DNNs’
vulnerability to single bit corruptions. For characterizing the
vulnerability, we analyze the impact of 1) the bitwise repre-
sentation of the corrupted parameter, and 2) various DNN
properties; on the resulting indiscriminate damage2. We also
discuss the broader implications of the vulnerability for both
the blind and surgical attackers. Finally, we turn our attention
to two distinct attack scenarios single bit-flips lead to.
4.1 Experimental Setup and Methodology
Our vulnerability analysis framework systematically flips the
bits in a model, individually, and quantifies the impact using
the metrics we define. We implement the framework using
Python 3.73 and PyTorch 1.04 that supports CUDA 9.0 for
accelerating computations by using GPUs. Our experiments
run on the high performance computing cluster that has 488
nodes, where each is equipped with Intel E5-2680v2 2.8GHz
20-core processors, 180 GB of RAM, and 40 of which have 2
Nvidia Tesla K20m GPUs. We achieve a significant amount
of speed-up by leveraging a parameter-level parallelism.
Datasets. We use three popular image classification
datasets: MNIST [31], CIFAR10 [29], and ImageNet [47].
MNIST is a grayscale image dataset used for handwritten dig-
its (zero to nine) recognition, containing 60,000 training and
10,000 validation images of 28x28 pixels. CIFAR10 and Ima-
geNet are colored image datasets used for object recognition.
CIFAR10 includes 32x32 pixels, colored natural images of
10 classes, containing 50,000 training and 10,000 validation
images. For ImageNet, we use the ILSVRC-2012 subset [46],
resized at 224x224 pixels, composed of 1,281,167 training
and 50,000 validation images from 1,000 classes.
Models. We conduct our analysis on 19 different DNN mod-
els. For MNIST, we define a baseline architecture, Base (B),
and generate four variants with different layer configurations:
B-Wide, B-PReLU, B-Dropout, and B-DP-Norm. We also
examine well-known LeNet5 (L5) [31] and test two variants
of it: L5-Dropout and L5-D-Norm. For CIFAR10, we em-
ploy the architecture from [55] as a baseline and experiment
on its three variants: B-Slim, B-Dropout and B-D-Norm. In
the following sections, we discuss why we generate these
variants. In Appendix A, we describe the details of these
custom architectures; in Appendix C, we present the hyper-
parameters. For CIFAR10, we also employ two off-the-shelf
2We use this term to indicate the severe overall accuracy drop in the model.
3https://www.python.org
4https://pytorch.org
network architectures: AlexNet [30] and VGG16 [50]. For Im-
ageNet, we use five well-known DNNs to understand the vul-
nerability of large models: AlexNet, VGG16, ResNet50 [22],
DenseNet161 [23] and InceptionV3 [56]5.
Metrics. To quantify the indiscriminate damage of sin-
gle bit-flips, we define the Relative Accuracy Drop as
RAD = (Accpristine−Acccorrupted)/Accpristine; where Accpristine and
Acccorrupted denote the classification accuracies of the pristine
and the corrupted models, respectively. In our experiments,
we use [RAD> 0.1] as the criterion for indiscriminate dam-
age on the model. We also measure the accuracy of each class
in the validation set to analyze whether a single bit-flip causes
a subset of classes to dominate the rest. In MNIST and CI-
FAR10, we simply compute the Top-1 accuracy on the test
data (as a percentage) and use the accuracy for analysis. For
ImageNet, we consider both the Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy;
however, for the sake of comparability, we report only Top-1
accuracy in Table 1. We consider a parameter as vulnerable
if it, in its bitwise representation, contains at least one bit
that triggers severe indiscriminate damage when flipped. For
quantifying the vulnerability of a model, we simply count the
number of these vulnerable parameters.
Methodology. On our 8 MNIST models, we carry out a
complete analysis: we flip each bit in all parameters of a
model, in both directions—(0→1) and (1→0)—and compute
the RAD over the entire validation set. However, a complete
analysis of the larger models requires infeasible computa-
tional time—the VGG16 model for ImageNet with 138M
parameters would take ≈ 942 days on our setup. Therefore,
based on our initial results, we devise three speed-up heuris-
tics that aid the analysis of CIFAR10 and ImageNet models.
Speed-up heuristics. The following three heuristics allow
us to feasibly and accurately estimate the vulnerability in
larger models:
• Sampled validation set (SV). After a bit-flip, deciding
whether the bit-flip leads to a vulnerability [RAD> 0.1]
requires testing the corrupted model on the validation set;
which might be cost prohibitive. This heuristic says that we
can still estimate the model accuracy—and the RAD—on
a sizable subset of the validation set. Thus, we randomly
sample 10% the instances from each class in the respective
validation sets, in both CIFAR10 and ImageNet experiments.
• Inspect only specific bits (SB). In Sec 2, we showed how
flipping different bits of a IEEE754 floating-point number
results in vastly different outcomes. Our the initial MNIST
analysis in Sec 4.3 shows that mainly the exponent bits lead to
perturbations strong enough to cause indiscriminate damage.
5The pre-trained ImageNet models we use are available at: https://
pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models.html.
Dataset Network Base acc. # Params Speed-up heuristics Vulnerablility
SV SB SP # Params Ratio
M
N
IS
T
B(ase) 95.71 21,840 7 7 7 10,972 50.24%
B-Wide 98.46 85,670 7 7 7 42,812 49.97%
B-PReLU 98.13 21,843 7 7 7 21,663 99.18%
B-Dropout 96.86 21,840 7 7 7 10,770 49.35%
B-DP-Norm 97.97 21,962 7 7 7 11,195 50.97%
L5 98.81 61,706 7 7 7 28,879 46.80%
L5-Dropout 98.72 61,706 7 7 7 27,806 45.06%
L5-D-Norm 99.05 62,598 7 7 7 30,686 49.02%
C
IF
A
R
10
B(ase) 83.74 776,394 3(83.74) 3(exp.) 7 363,630 46.84%
B-Slim 82.19 197,726 3(82.60) 3(exp.) 7 92,058 46.68%
B-Dropout 81.18 776,394 3(80.70) 3(exp.) 7 314,745 40.54%
B-D-Norm 80.17 777,806 3(80.17) 3(exp.) 7 357,448 45.96%
AlexNet 83.96 2,506,570 3(85.00) 3(exp.) 7 1,185,957 47.31%
VGG16 91.34 14,736,727 3(91.34) 3(exp.) 7 6,812,359 46.23%
Im
ag
eN
et
AlexNet 56.52 / 79.07 61,100,840 3(51.12 / 75.66) 3(31st bit) 3(20,000) 9,467 SP 47.34%
VGG16 79.52 / 90.38 138,357,544 3(64.28 / 86.56) 3(31st bit) 3(20,000) 8,414 SP 42.07%
ResNet50 76.13 / 92.86 25,610,152 3(69.76 / 89.86) 3(31st bit) 3(20,000) 9,565 SP 47.82%
DenseNet161 77.13 / 93.56 28,900,936 3(72.48 / 90.94) 3(31st bit) 3(20,000) 9,790 SP 48.95%
InceptionV3 69.54 / 88.65 27,197,488 3(65.74 / 86.24) 3(31st bit) 3(20,000) 8,161 SP 40.84%
SV = Sampled Validation set SB = Specific Bits SP = Sampled Parameters set
Table 1: Indiscriminate damages to 19 DNN models caused by single bit-flips.
This observation is the basis of our SB heuristic that tells us
to examine the effects of flipping only the exponent bits for
CIFAR10 models. For ImageNet models, we use a stronger
SB heuristic and only inspect the most significant exponent
bit of a parameter to achieve a greater speed-up. This heuristic
causes us to miss the vulnerability the remaining bits might
lead to, therefore, its results can be interpreted as a conser-
vative estimate of the actual number of vulnerable parameters.
• Sampled parameters (SP) set. Our MNIST analysis also
reveals that almost 50% of all parameters are vulnerable to
bit-flips. This leads to our third heuristic: uniformly sampling
from the parameters of a model would still yield an accurate
estimation of the vulnerability. We utilize the SP heuristic for
ImageNet models and uniformly sample a fixed number of
parameters—20,000—from all parameters in a model. In our
experiments, we perform this sampling five times and report
the average vulnerability across all runs. Uniform sampling
also reflects the fact that a black-box attacker has a uniform
probability of corrupting any parameter.
4.2 Quantifying the Vulnerability That Leads
to Indiscriminate Damage
Table 1 presents the results of our experiments on single-bit
corruptions, for 19 different DNN models. We reveal that
an attacker, armed with a single bit-flip attack primitive, can
successfully cause indiscriminate damage [RAD> 0.1] and
that the ratio of vulnerable parameters in a model varies be-
tween 40% to 99%; depending on the model. The consistency
between MNIST experiments, in which we examine every
possible bit-flip, and the rest, in which we heuristically exam-
ine only a subset, shows that, in a DNN model, approximately
half of the parameters are vulnerable to single bit-flips. Our
experiments also show small variability in the chances of a
successful attack—indicated by the ratio of vulnerable pa-
rameters. With 40% vulnerable parameters, the InceptionV3
model is the most apparent outlier among the other ImageNet
models; compared to 42-49% for the rest. We define the vul-
nerability based on [RAD> 0.1] and, in Appendix B, we also
present how vulnerability changes within the range [0.1 ≤
RAD≤ 1]. In the following subsections, we characterize the
vulnerability in relation to various factors and discuss our
results in more detail.
4.3 Characterizing the Vulnerability: Bitwise
Representation
Here, we characterize the interaction how the features of a
parameter’s bitwise representation govern its vulnerability.
Impact of the bit-flip position. To examine how much
change in a parameter’s value leads to indiscriminate damage,
we focus on the position of the corrupted bits. In Figure 1,
for each bit position, we present the number of bits—in the
log-scale—that cause indiscriminate damage when flipped,
on MNIST-L5 and CIFAR10-AlexNet models. In our MNIST
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Figure 1: The impact of the bit position. The number of
vulnerable parameters in bit positions 32nd to 24th.
experiments, we examine all bit positions and we observe that
bit positions other than the exponents mostly do not lead to
significant damage; therefore, we only consider the exponent
bits. We find that the exponent bits, especially the 31st-bit,
lead to indiscriminate damage. The reason is that a bit-flip in
the exponents causes to a drastic change of a parameter value,
whereas a flip in the mantissa only increases or decreases the
value by a small amount—[0,1]. We also observe that flipping
the 30th to 28th bits is mostly inconsequential as these bits,
in the IEEE754 representation, are already set to one for most
values a DNN parameter usually takes—[3.0517×10−5, 2].
Impact of the flip direction. We answer which direction of
the bit-flip, (0→1) or (1→0), leads to greater indiscriminate
damage. In Table 2, we report the number of effective bit-
flips, i.e., those that inflict [RAD > 0.1] for each direction,
on 3 MNIST and 2 CIFAR10 models. We observe that only
(0→1) flips cause indiscriminate damage and no (1→0) flip
leads to vulnerability. The reason is that a (1→0) flip can
only decrease a parameter’s value, unlike a (0→1) flip. The
values of model parameters are usually normally distributed—
N(0,1)—that places most of the values within [-1,1] range.
Therefore, a (1→0) flip, in the exponents, can decrease the
magnitude of a typical parameter at most by one; which is not
a strong enough change to inflict critical damage. Similarly, in
the sign bit, both (0→1) and (1→0) flips cannot cause severe
damage because they change the magnitude of a parameter at
most by two. On the other hand, a (0→1) flip, in the exponents,
can increase the parameter value significantly; thus, during
the forward-pass, the extreme neuron activation caused by the
corrupted parameter overrides the rest of the activations.
Direction Models (M: MNIST, C: CIFAR10)
(32-24th bits) M-B M-PReLU M-L5 C-B C-AlexNet
(0→1) 11,019 21,711 28,902 314,768 1,185,964
(1→0) 0 0 0 0 0
Total 11,019 21,711 28,902 314,768 1,185,964
Table 2: The impact of the flip direction. The number of
effective bit-flips in 3 MNIST and 2 CIFAR10 models.
Impact of the parameter sign. As our third feature, we
investigate whether the sign—positive or negative—of the
corrupted parameter impacts the vulnerability. In Figure 2,
we examine the MNIST-L5 model and present the number of
vulnerable positive and negative parameters in each layer—in
the log-scale. Our results suggest that positive parameters are
more vulnerable to single bit-flips than negative parameters.
We identify the common ReLU activation function as the
reason: ReLU immediately zeroes out the negative activation
values, which are usually caused by the negative parameters.
As a result, the detrimental effects of corrupting a negative
parameter fail to propagate further in the model. Moreover,
we observe that in the first and last layers, the negative pa-
rameters, as well as the positive ones, are vulnerable. We
hypothesize that, in the first convolutional layer, changes in
the parameters yield a similar effect to corrupting the model
inputs directly. On the other hand, in their last layers, DNNs
usually have the Softmax function that does not have the same
zeroing-out effect as ReLU.
4.4 Characterizing the Vulnerability: DNN
Properties
We continue our analysis by investigating how various proper-
ties of a DNN model affect the model’s vulnerability to single
bit-flips.
Impact of the layer width. We start our analysis by asking
whether increasing the width of a DNN affects the number
of vulnerable parameters. In Table 1, in terms of the number
of vulnerable parameters, we compare the MNIST-B model
with the MNIST-B-Wide model. In the wide model, all the
convolutional and fully-connected layers are twice as wide
as the corresponding layer in the base model. We see that
the ratio of vulnerable parameters is almost the same for
both models: 50.2% vs 50.0%. Further, experiments on the
CIFAR10-B-Slim and CIFAR10-B—twice as wide as the slim
model—produce consistent results: 46.7% and 46.8%. We
conclude that the number of vulnerable parameters grows
proportionally with the DNN’s width and, as a result, the ratio
of vulnerable parameters remains constant at around 50%.
Impact of the activation function. Next, we explore
whether the choice of activation function affects the vulner-
ability. Previously, we showed that ReLU can neutralize the
effects of large negative parameters caused by a bit-flip; thus,
we experiment on different activation functions that allow neg-
ative outputs, e.g., PReLU [21], LeakyReLU, or RReLU [68].
These ReLU variants have been shown to improve the training
performance and the accuracy of a DNN. In this experiment,
we train the MNIST-B-PReLU model; which is exactly the
same as the MNIST-B model, except that it replaces ReLU
with PReLU. Figure 3 presents the layer-wise number of
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vulnerable positive and negative parameters in MNIST-B-
PReLU. We observe that using PReLU causes the negative
parameters to become vulnerable and, as a result, leads to a
DNN approximately twice as vulnerable as the one that uses
ReLU—50.2% vs. 99.2% vulnerable parameters.
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Figure 4: The impact of the dropout and batch normal-
ization. The distributions of the parameter values of three
CIFAR10 models variants.
Impact of dropout and batch normalization. We con-
firmed that successful bit-flip attacks increase a parameter’s
value drastically to cause indiscriminate damage. In conse-
quence, we hypothesize that common techniques that tend to
constrain the model parameter values to improve the perfor-
mance, e.g., dropout [52] or batch normalization [24], would
result in a model more resilient to single bit-flips. Besides the
base CIFAR10 and MNIST models, we train the B-Dropout
and B-DNorm models for comparison. In B-Dropout models,
we apply dropout before and after the first fully-connected
layers; in B-DNorm models, in addition to dropout, we also
apply batch normalization after each convolutional layer. In
Figure 4, we compare our three CIFAR10 models and show
how dropout and batch normalization have the effect of re-
ducing the parameter values. However, when we look into the
vulnerability of these models, we surprisingly find that the vul-
nerability is mostly persistent regardless of dropout or batch
normalization—with at most 6.3% reduction in vulnerable
parameter ratio over the base network.
Impact of the model architecture. Table 1 shows that the
vulnerable parameter ratio is mostly consistent across differ-
ent DNN architectures. However, we see that the InceptionV3
model for ImageNet has a relatively lower ratio—40.8%—
compared to the other models—between 42.1% and 48.9%.
We hypothesize that the reason is the auxiliary classifiers in
the InceptionV3 architecture that have no function at test-time.
To confirm our hypothesis, we simply remove the parame-
ters in the auxiliary classifiers; which bring the vulnerability
ratio closer to the other models—46.5%. Interestingly, we
also observe that the parameters in batch normalization lay-
ers are resilient to a bit-flip: corrupting running_mean and
running_var cause negligible damage. In consequence, ex-
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Figure 5: The security threat in a transfer learning scenario. The victim model—student—that is trained by transfer learning
is vulnerable to the surgical attacker, who can see the parameters the victim has in common with the teacher model.
cluding the parameters in InceptionV3’s multiple batch nor-
malization layers leads to a slight increase in vulnerability—
by 0.02%.
4.5 Implications for the Adversaries
In Sec 3, we defined four attack scenarios: the blind and sur-
gical attackers, in the black-box and white-box settings. First,
we consider the strongest attacker: the surgical, who can flip a
bit at a specific memory location; white-box, with the model
knowledge for anticipating the impact of flipping the said bit.
To carry out the attack, this attacker identifies: 1) how much
indiscriminate damage, the RAD goal, she intends to inflict,
2) a vulnerable parameter that can lead to the RAD goal, 3) in
this parameter, the bit location, e.g., 31st-bit, and the flip di-
rection, e.g., (0→1), for inflicting the damage. Based on our
[RAD> 0.1] criterion, approximately 50% of the parameters
are vulnerable in all models; thus, for this goal, the attacker
can easily achieve 100% success rate. For more severe goals
[0.1≤RAD≤ 0.9], our results in Appendix B suggest that the
attacker can still find vulnerable parameters. In Sec 5.1, we
discuss the necessary primitives, in a practical setting, for this
attacker.
For a black-box surgical attacker, on the other hand, the
best course of action is to target the 31st-bit of a parameter.
This strategy maximizes the attacker’s chance of causing in-
discriminate damage, even without knowing what, or where,
the corrupted parameter is. Considering, the VGG16 model
for ImageNet, the attack’s success rate is 42.1% as we report
in Table 1; which is an upper-bound for the black-box attack-
ers. For the weakest—black-box blind—attacker that cannot
specifically target the 31st-bit, we conservatively estimate the
lower-bound as 42.1% / 32-bits = 1.32%; assuming only the
31st-bits lead to indiscriminate damage. Note that the success
rate for the white-box blind attacker is still 1.32% as acting
upon the knowledge of the vulnerable parameters requires an
attacker to target specific parameters. In Sec 5.2, we evaluate
the practical success rate of a blind attacker.
4.6 Distinct Attack Scenarios
In this section, other than causing indiscriminate damage, we
discuss two distinct attack scenarios single bit-flips might
enable: transfer learning and targeted misclassification.
Transfer learning scenario. Transfer learning is a com-
mon technique for transferring the knowledge in a pre-trained
teacher model to a student model; which, in many cases,
outperforms training a model from scratch. In a practical
scenario, a service provider might rely on publicly available
teacher as a starting point to train commercial student models.
The teacher’s knowledge is transferred by freezing some of
its layers and embedding them into the student model; which,
then, trains the remaining layers for its own task. The security
risk is that, for an attacker who knows the teacher but not the
student, a black-box attack on the student might escalate into
a white-box attack on the teacher’s frozen layers. The attacker
first downloads the pre-trained teacher from the Internet. She
then loads the teacher into the memory and waits for the dedu-
plication [66] to happen. During deduplication, the memory
pages with the same contents—the frozen layers—are merged
into the shared pages between the victim and attacker. This
essentially promotes a blind threat to the victim’s memory to
a stronger surgical threat to the attacker’s own memory. In
consequence, a bit-flip in the attacker’s own pages can also
affect the student model in the victim’s memory.
We hypothesize that an attacker, who can identify the
teacher’s vulnerable parameters and trigger bit-flips in these
parameters, can cause indiscriminate damage to the student
model. In our experiments, we examine two transfer learning
tasks in [63]: the traffic sign (GTSRB) [53] and flower recog-
nition (Flower102) [41]. We initialize the student model by
transferring first ten frozen layers of the teacher—VGG16 or
ResNet50 on ImageNet. We then append a new classification
layer and train the resulting student network for its respective
task by only updating the new unfrozen layer. We corrupt the
1,000 parameters sampled from each layer in the teacher and
monitor the damage to the student model. Figure 5 reports our
results: we find that all vulnerable parameters in the frozen
Figure 6: The vulnerable parameters for a targeted attack in 3 DNN models. Each cell reports the number of bits that lead
to the misclassification of a target sample, whose original class is given by the x-axis, as the target class, which is given by the
y-axis. From left to right, the models are MNIST-B, MNIST-L5 and CIFAR10-AlexNet.
layers and more than a half in the re-trained layers are shared
by the teacher and the student.
Targeted misclassification. Although our main focus is
showing DNNs’ graceless degradation, we conduct an ad-
ditional experiment and ask whether a single bit-flip primitive
could be used in the context of targeted misclassification at-
tacks. A targeted attack aims to preserve the victim model’s
overall accuracy while causing it to misclassify a specific
target sample into the target class. We experiment with a tar-
get sample from each class in MNIST or CIFAR10—we use
MNIST-B, MNIST-L5 and CIFAR10-AlexNet models. Our
white-box surgical attacker also preserves the accuracy by
limiting the [RAD< 0.05] as in [55]. We find that the number
of vulnerable parameters for targeted misclassifications is
lower than that of for causing indiscriminate damage. In Fig-
ure 6, we also see that for some (original–target class) pairs,
the vulnerability is more evident. For example, in MNIST-B,
there are 141 vulnerable parameters for (class 4–class 6) and
209 parameters for (class 6–class 0). Simlarly, in CIFAR10-
AlexNet, there are 6,000 parameters for (class 2–class 3);
3,000 parameters for (class 3–class 6); and 8,000 parameters
for (class 6–class 3).
5 Exploiting Using Rowhammer
In order to corroborate the analysis made in Sec 4 and prove
the viability of hardware fault attacks against DNN, we test
the resiliency of these models against Rowhammer. At a high
level, Rowhammer is a software-induced fault attack that pro-
vides the attacker with a single-bit write primitive to specific
physical memory locations. That is, an attacker capable of
performing specific memory access patterns (at DRAM-level)
can induce persistent and repeatable bit corruptions from
software. Given that we focus on single-bit perturbations on
DNN’s parameters in practical settings, Rowhammer repre-
sents the perfect candidate for the task.
DRAM internals. In Figure 7, we show the internals of a
DRAM bank. A bank is a bi-dimensional array of memory
cells connected to a row buffer. Every DRAM chip contains
multiple banks. The cells are the actual storage of one’s data.
They contain a capacitor whose charge determines the value
of a specific bit in memory. When a read is issued to a specific
row, this row gets activated, which means that its content gets
transferred to the row buffer before being sent to the CPU.
Activation is often requested to recharge a row’s capacitors
(i.e., refresh operation) since they leak charge over time.
Rowhammer mechanism. Rowhammer is a DRAM distur-
bance error that causes spurious bit-flips in DRAM cells gener-
ated by frequent activations of a neighboring row. Here, we fo-
cus on double-sided Rowhammer, the most common and effec-
tive Rowhammer variant used in practical attacks [15, 44, 62].
Figure 8 exemplifies a typical double-sided Rowhammer at-
tack. The victim’s data is stored in a row enclosed between
two aggressor rows that are repeatedly accessed by the at-
tacker. Due to the continuous activations of the neighboring
rows, the victim’s data is under intense duress. Thus, there is
a large probability of bit-flips on its content.
To implement such attack variant, the attacker usually needs
some knowledge or control over the physical memory layout.
Depending on the attack scenario, a Rowhammer-enabled at-
Row Buffer
Figure 7: DRAM bank structure.
Zoom-in on a cell containing the
capacitor storing data.
Row Buffer
Figure 8: Double-sided
Rowhammer. Aggressor rows
, and a victim row
.
DRAM # (0→1) flips DRAM # (0→1) flips
A_2 21,538 A_4 5,577
E_2 16,320 I_1 4,781
H_1 10,608 J_1 4,725
G_1 7,851 E_1 4,175
A_1 4,367 A_3 1,541
F_1 5,927 C_1 1,365
Table 3: Hammertime database [58]. We report the number
of (0→1) bit-flips in 12 different DRAM setups. (The rows
in gray are used for the experiments in Figure 9.)
tacker can rely on a different set of primitives for this purpose.
In our analysis, we consider two possible scenarios: 1) we
initially consider the surgical attacker; that is, an attacker with
the capability of causing bit-flips at the specific locations, and
we demonstrate how, under these assumptions, she can in-
duce indiscriminate damage to a co-located DNN application.
2) We then deprive the attacker of this ability to analyze the
outcome of a blind attacker and we demonstrate that, even
in a more restricted environment, the attacker can still cause
indiscriminate damage by causing bitwise corruptions.
Experimental setup. For our analysis, we constructed a
simulated environment6 relying on a database of the Rowham-
mer vulnerability in 12 DRAM chips, provided by Tatar et
al [58]. Different memory chips have a different degree of
susceptibility to the Rowhammer vulnerability, enabling us
to study the impact of Rowhammer attacks on DNNs in dif-
ferent real-world scenarios. Table 3 reports the susceptibility
of the different memory chips to Rowhammer. Here, we only
include the numbers for (0→1) bit-flips since these are the
more interesting ones for the attacker targeting a DNN model
according to our earlier analysis in Sec 4.3 and Sec 4.4.
We perform our analysis on an exemplary deep learning
application implemented in PyTorch, constantly querying an
ImageNet model. We use ImageNet models since we focus on
a scenario where the victim has a relevant memory footprint
that can be realistically be targeted by hardware fault attacks
such as Rowhammer in practical settings. While small models
are also potential targets, the number of interesting locations
to corrupt is typically limited to draw general conclusions on
the practical effectiveness of the attack.
5.1 Surgical Attack Using Rowhammer
We start our analysis by discussing a surgical attacker, who has
the capability of causing a bit-flip at the specific location in
6We first implemented all the steps described in our paper on a physical
system, considering using end-to-end attacks for our analysis. After prelim-
inary testing of this strategy on our own DRAMs, we concluded it would
be hard to generalize the findings of such an analysis and decided against
it—in line with observations from prior work [59].
Network Vuln. Objects Vuln. Params #Hammer Attempts
(Vuln./Total) (in 20k params) (min / med / max)
AlexNet 7/16 9,522 4/64/4,679
VGG16 12/32 8,140 4/64/4,679
ResNet50 9/102 3,466 4/64/4,679
DenseNet161 63/806 5,117 4/64/4,679
InceptionV3 53/483 6,711 4/64/4,679
Table 4: Effectiveness of surgical attacks. We examine five
different ImageNet models analyzed in Sec 4.
memory. The two surgical attackers are available: the attacker
with the knowledge of the victim model (white-box) and with-
out (black-box). However, in this section, we assume that the
strongest attacker knows the parameters to compromise and
is capable of triggering bit-flips on its corresponding memory
location. Then, this attacker can take advantage of accurate
memory massing primitives (e.g., memory deduplication) to
achieve 100% attack success rate.
Memory templating. Since a surgical attacker knows the
location of vulnerable parameters, she can template the mem-
ory up front [44]. That is, the attacker scans the memory by
inducing Rowhammer bit-flips in her own allocated chunks
and looking for exploitable bit-flips. A surgical attacker aims
at specific bit-flips. Hence, while templating the memory, the
attacker simplifies the scan by looking for bit-flips located at
specific offsets from the start address of a memory page (i.e.,
4 KB)—the smallest possible chunk allocated from the OS.
This allows the attacker to find memory pages vulnerable to
Rowhammer bit-flips at a given page offset (i.e., vulnerable
templates), which they can later use to predictably attack the
victim data stored at that location.
Vulnerable templates. To locate the parameters of the at-
tacker’s interest (i.e., vulnerable parameters) within the mem-
ory page, she needs to find page-aligned data in the victim
model. Modern memory allocators improve performances
by storing large objects (usually multiples of the page size)
page-aligned whereas smaller objects are not. Thus, we first
analyze the allocations performed by the PyTorch framework
running on Python to understand if it performs such optimized
page-aligned allocations for large objects similar to other pro-
grams [16, 39]. We discovered this to be the case for all the
objects larger than 1 MB—i.e., our attacker needs to target the
parameters such as weight, bias, and so on, stored as tensor
objects in layers, larger than 1 MB.
Then, again focusing on the ImageNet models, we analyzed
them to identify the objects that satisfy this condition. Even if
the ratio between the total number of objects and target objects
may seem often unbalanced in favor of the small ones7, we
7The bias in convolutional or dense layers, and the running_mean and
running_var in batch-norms are usually the small objects (< 1 MB).
found that the number of vulnerable parameters in the target
objects is still significant (see Table 4). Furthermore, it is
important to note that when considering a surgical attacker,
she only needs one single vulnerable template to compromise
the victim model, and there is only 1,024 possible offsets
where we can store a 4-byte parameter within a 4 KB page.
Memory massaging. After finding a vulnerable template,
the attacker needs to massage the memory to land the vic-
tim’s data on the vulnerable template. This can be achieved,
for instance, by exploiting memory deduplication [9, 44, 67].
Memory deduplication is a system-level memory optimization
that merges read-only pages for different processes or VMs
when they contain the same data. These pages re-split when a
write is issued to them. However, Rowhammer behaves as in-
visible bit-wise writes that do not trigger the spit, breaking the
process boundaries. If the attacker knows (even if partially)
the content of the victim model can take advantage of this
merging primitive to compromise the victim service.
Experimental results. Based on the results of the experi-
ments in Sec 4.3 and Sec 4.4, we analyze the requirements for
a surgical (white-box) attacker to carry out a successful attack.
Here, we used one set of the five sampled parameters for each
model. In Table 4, we report min, median, and max values
of the number of rows that an attacker needs to hammer to
find the first vulnerable template on the 12 different DRAM
setups for each model. This provides a meaningful metric to
understand the success rate of a surgical attack. As you can
see in Table 4, the results remain unchanged among all the
different models. That is, for every model we tested in the
best case, it required us to hammer only 4 rows (A_2 DRAM
setup) to find a vulnerable template all the way up to 4,679
in the worst case scenario (C_1). The reason why the results
are equal among the different models is due to the number of
vulnerable parameters which largely exceeds the number of
possible offsets within a page that can store such parameters
(i.e., 1024). Since every vulnerable parameter yields indis-
criminate damage [RAD> 0.1], we simply need to identify
a template that could match any given vulnerable parameter.
This means that an attacker can find a vulnerable template
at best in a matter of few seconds8 and at worst still within
minutes. Once the vulnerable template is found, the attacker
can leverage memory deduplication to mount an effective
attack against the DNN model—with no interference with the
rest of the system.
5.2 Blind Attack Using Rowhammer
While in Sec 5.1 we analyzed the outcome of a surgical attack,
here we abstract some of the assumptions made above and
study the effectiveness of a blind attacker oblivious of the
8We assume 200ms to hammer a row.
bit-flip location in memory. To bound the time of the lengthy
blind Rowhammer attack analysis, we specifically focus our
experiments on the ImageNet-VGG16 model.
We run our PyTorch application under the pressure of
Rowhammer bit-flips indiscriminately targeting both code
and data regions of the process’s memory. Our goal is twofold:
1) to understand the effectiveness of such attack vector in a
less controlled environment and 2) to examine the robustness
of a running DNN application to Rowhammer bit-flips by
measuring the number of failures (i.e., crashes) that our blind
attacker may inadvertently induce.
Attacker’s capabilities. We consider a blind attacker who
cannot control the bit-flips caused by Rowhammer. As a result,
the attacker may corrupt bits in the DNN’s parameters as well
as the code blocks in the victim process’s memory. In princi-
ple, since Rowhammer bit-flips propagate at the DRAM level,
a fully blind Rowhammer attacker may also inadvertently
flip bits in other system memory locations. In practice, even
an attacker with limited knowledge of the system memory
allocator, can heavily influence the physical memory layout
by means of specially crafted memory allocations [17, 18].
Since this strategy allows attackers to achieve co-location
with the victim memory and avoid unnecessary fault propaga-
tion in practical settings, we restrict our analysis to a scenario
where bit-flips can only (blindly) corrupt memory of the vic-
tim deep learning process. This also generalizes our analysis
to arbitrary deployment scenarios, since the effectiveness of
blind attacks targeting arbitrary system memory is inherently
environment-specific.
Methods. For every one of the 12 vulnerable DRAM se-
tups available in the database, we carried out 25 experiments
where we performed at most 300 “hammering” attempts—
value chosen after the surgical attack analysis where a median
of 64 attempts was required. The experiment has three possi-
ble outcomes: 1) we trigger one(or more) effective bit-flip(s)
that compromise the model, and we record the relative accu-
racy drop when performing our testing queries; 2) we trigger
one(or more) effective bit-flip(s) in other victim memory loca-
tions that result in a crash of the deep learning process; 3) we
reach the “timeout” value of 300 hammering attempts. We
set such “timeout” value to bound our experimental analysis
which would otherwise result too lengthy.
Experimental results. In Figure 9, we present the results
for three sampled DRAM setups. We picked A_2, I_1, and C_1
as representative samples since they are the most, least, and
moderately vulnerable DRAM chips (see Table 3). Depending
on the DRAM setup, we obtain fairly different results. We
found A_2 obtains successful indiscriminate damages to the
model in 24 out of 25 experiments while, in less vulnerable
environments such as C_1, the number of successes decreases
I_1
DRAM
Configuration
Figure 9: The successful runs of a blind attack execution
over three different DRAM setups (A_2-most, I_1-least,
and C_1-moderately vulnerable). We report the success in
terms of # f lips and #hammer attempts required to obtain an
indiscriminate damage to the victim model. We observe the
successes within few hammering attempts.
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Figure 10: The distribution of relative accuracy drop for
Top-1 and Top-5. We compute them over the effective # f lips
in our experiments on the ImageNet-VGG16 model.
to only one while the other 24 times out. However, it is im-
portant to note that a timeout does not represent a negative
result—a crash. Contrarily, while C_1 only had a single suc-
cessful attack, it also represents a peculiar case corroborating
the analysis presented in Sec 4. The corruption generated in
this single successful experiment was induced by a single bit-
flip, which caused one of the most significant RADs detected
in the entire experiment, i.e., 0.9992 and 0.9959 in Top-1 and
Top-5. Regardless of this edge case, we report a mean of 15.6
out of 25 effective attacks for this Rowhammer variant over
the different DRAM setups. Moreover, we report the distribu-
tion of accuracy drops for Top-1 and Top-5 in Figure 10. In
particular, the median drop for Top-1 and Top-5 confirms the
claims made in the previous sections, i.e., the blind attacker
can expect [RAD> 0.1] on average.
Interestingly, when studying the robustness of the victim
process to Rowhammer, we discovered it to be quite resilient
to spurious bit-flips. We registered only 6 crashes over all
the different DRAM configurations and experiments—300
in total. This shows that the model effectively dominates the
memory footprint of the victim process and confirms findings
from our earlier analysis that bit-flips in non-vulnerable model
elements have essentially no noticeable impact.
5.3 Synopsis
Throughout the section, we analyzed the outcome of surgi-
cal and blind attacks against large DNN models and demon-
strated how Rowhammer can be deployed as a feasible at-
tack vector against these models. These results corroborate
our findings in Sec 4 where we estimated at least 40% of a
model’s parameters to be vulnerable to single-bit corruptions.
Due to this large attack surface, in Sec 5.1, we showed that
a Rowhammer-enabled attacker armed with knowledge of
the network’s parameters and powerful memory massaging
primitives [44, 62, 67] can carry out precise and effective in-
discriminate attacks in a matter of, at most, few minutes in our
simulated environment. Furthermore, this property, combined
with the resiliency to spurious bit-flips of the (perhaps idle)
code regions, allowed us to build successful blind attacks
against the ImageNet-VGG16 model and inflict “terminal
brain damage” even when the model is hidden from the at-
tacker.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss and evaluate some potential mit-
igation mechanisms to protect against single-bit attacks on
DNN models. We discuss two research directions towards
making DNN models resilient to bit-flips: restricting activa-
tion magnitudes and using low-precision numbers. Prior work
on defenses against Rowhammer attacks suggests system-
level defenses [10, 27] that often even require specific hard-
ware support [6, 26]. Yet they have not been widely deployed
since they require infrastructure-wide changes from cloud
host providers. Moreover, even though the infrastructure is re-
silient to Rowhammer attacks, an adversary can leverage other
vectors to exploit bit-flip attacks for corrupting a model. Thus,
we focus on the solutions that can be directly implemented
on the defended DNN model.
6.1 Restricting Activation Magnitudes
In Sec 4.4, we showed that the vulnerable parameter ratio
varies based on inherent properties of a DNN; for instance,
using PReLU activation function causes a model to propagate
negative extreme activations. We hypothesize that an acti-
vation function, which produces its output in a constrained
range, would make indiscriminate damage harder to induce
via bit-flips. There are several functions, such as Tanh or
HardTanh [25], that suppress the activations; however, using
ReLU-6 [28] function provides two key advantages over the
Network Train Base acc. # Params Vulnerability
Base (ReLU) Scr 98.13
21,840
10,972 (50.2%)
Base (ReLU6) Scr 98.16 313 (1.4%)
Base (Tanh) Scr 97.25 507 (2.3%)
Base (ReLU6) Sub 95.71 542 (2.4%)
AlexNet (ReLU) - 56.52 / 79.07 20,000
(61M)
9.467 (47.34%)
AlexNet (ReLU6) Sub 39.80 / 65.82 560 (2.8%)
AlexNet (ReLUA) Sub 56.52 / 79.07 1,063 (5.32%)
VGG16 (ReLU) - 64.28 / 86.56 20,000
(138M)
8,227 (41.13%)
VGG16 (ReLU6) Sub 38.58 / 64.84 2,339 (11.67%)
VGG16 (ReLUA) Sub 64.28 / 86.56 2,427 (12.14%)
Table 5: Effectiveness of restricting activation.
others: 1) the defender only needs to substitute the existing ac-
tivation functions from ReLU to ReLU6 without re-training,
and 2) ReLUA functions allow the defender to control the
activation range by modifying the A, e.g., using A > 6 to mini-
mize the performance loss the substitution causes. A defender
can monitor the activation values over the validation set and to
determine an activation range that only suppresses the abnor-
mal values, potentially caused by bit-flips. In our experiments
on ImageNet-AlexNet, we set the range as [0,max], where
max is determined adaptively by observing the maximum
activation in each layer (ReLU-A).
Experiments. We use three DNN models in Sec 4: the
MNIST-B, ImageNet-AlexNet, and ImageNet-VGG16 mod-
els. We evaluate four activation functions: ReLU (default),
Tanh, ReLU6, and ReLUA (only for AlexNet and VGG16);
and two training methods: training a model from scratch (Scr)
or substituting the existing activation into another (Sub). In
our notation, we denote the model’s name together with its
activation function, e.g., AlexNet (ReLU6) For larger models,
we also rely on our speed-up heuristics for estimating the
vulnerability.
Table 5 shows the effectiveness of this defensive mech-
anism. For each network (Column 1), we list the training
method, the base accuracy, the number of sampled parame-
ters, and the vulnerability (Column 2-5). We find that, in some
cases, restricting activation magnitudes with Tanh and ReLU6
reduces the vulnerability. For instance, in the MNIST models,
we observe that the ratio of vulnerable parameters drops to
1.4-2.4% from 50%; without incurring any significant perfor-
mance loss. Further, we discover that the substitution with
ReLU6 achieves a similar effect without re-training; however,
it fails to prevent the vulnerability in the last layer, which
uses Softmax instead of ReLU. In AlexNet and VGG16, we
also observe a decrease in the ratio of vulnerable parameters—
47.34% to 2.8% and 41.13% to 11.67%—; however, with
significant loss of accuracy. To minimize the loss, we set
the range of activation in AlexNet (ReLUA) and VGG16
(ReLUA) by selecting the maximum activation value in each
layer. We see that ReLUA leads to a trade-off between the
Network Method Base acc. # Params Vulnerability
L5 - 99.24 62,598 30,686 (49.0%)
L5 8-bit Quantized 99.03 62,600 0 (0.0%)
L5 XNOR Binarized 98.39 62,286 623 (1.0%)
Table 6: Effectiveness of using low-precision.
ratio of vulnerable parameters and the accuracy.
Takeaways. Our experimental results on restricting acti-
vation magnitudes suggest that this mechanism 1) allows a
defender to control the trade-off between the relative accuracy
drop and reducing the vulnerable parameters and 2) enables
ad-hoc defenses to DNN models, which does not require train-
ing the network from scratch. However, the remaining number
of vulnerable parameters shows that the Rowhammer attacker
still could inflict damage, with a reduced success rate.
6.2 Using Low-precision Numbers
Another direction is to represent the model parameters as low-
precision numbers by using quantization and binarization. In
Sec 4.3, we found that the vulnerability exploits the bitwise
representation of the corrupted parameter to induce the dra-
matic chances in the parameter’s value. We hypothesize that
the use of low-precision numbers would make a parameter
more resilient to such changes. For example, an integer ex-
pressed as the 8-bit quantized format can be increased at most
128 by a flip in the most significant bit—8th bit. Therefore,
the attacker only can cause restricted increases in a model
parameter. Training models using low-precision numbers are
supported by the popular deep learning frameworks such as
TensorFlow9. The victim can train and deploy the model with
quantized or binarized parameters on these frameworks.
Experiments. To test our hypothesis, we use 3 DNN mod-
els: the MNIST-L5 (baseline) and its quantized and binarized
variants. To quantize the MNIST-L5 model, we use the 8-bit
quantization in [7, 64], which converts the model parameters
in all layers into integers between 0 and 255. For the binariza-
tion, we employ XNOR-Net [43], which converts the model
parameters to -1 and 1, except for the first convolutional layer.
Using these variants, we evaluate the vulnerability to single
bit-flips and report the accuracy, total parameters and vulner-
ability; without the speed-up heuristics.
Table 6 shows the effectiveness of using low-precision pa-
rameters. For each network (Column 1), we report the quan-
tization method, the accuracy, the number of vulnerable pa-
rameters and their percentage (Columns 2-5). We find that
using low-precision parameters reduces the vulnerability: in
all cases, the ratio of vulnerable parameters drops from 49%
9https://www.tensorflow.org/lite/performance/post_training_
quantization
(Baseline) to 0-2% (surprisingly 0% with the quantization).
We also observe that, in the binarized model, the first convo-
lutional and the last classification layers contain most of the
vulnerable parameters; with 150 and 420 vulnerable parame-
ters, respectively. This also corroborates with our results in
Sec 4.3.
Takeaways. Even though 8-bit quantization mitigates the
vulnerability, in a real-world scenario, training a large model,
such as [65], from scratch can take a week on a supercomput-
ing cluster. This computational burden lessens the practicality
of this defensive mechanism.
7 Related Work
DNN’s resilience to perturbations. Prior work has uti-
lized the graceful degredation of DNN models under parame-
ter perturbations in a wide range of applications. For example,
network quantization [3, 5], by quantizing a DNN model’s
high-precision parameter into low-precision, reduces the size
and inference time of a model with negligible performance
penalty. This property has also been used as a primitive for
improving the security of DNNs. For example, modifying the
parameter slightly to inject a watermark to allow model own-
ers to prove ownership [1]; adding Gaussian noise to model
parameter for reducing the reliability of test-time adversarial
attacks on DNNs [69]; and fine-tuning the parameters for
mitigating the malicious backdoors in a model [37]. Further,
the resilience to structural changes has lead to pruning tech-
niques [4, 20, 35] which improve the efficiency of a DNN
model by removing unimportant neurons along with their pa-
rameters. In our work, we study the graceless degredation of
DNNs under hardware fault attacks that induce single bit-flips
in individual parameters.
Indiscriminate poisoning attacks on DNNs. Recent work
on adversarial machine learning has demonstrated many at-
tack scenarios to inflict indiscriminate damage on a model.
One of the well-studied vectors is indiscriminate poisoning
attacks [8] in which the adversary, by injecting malicious data
in the victim’s training set, aims to hurt the model. Previ-
ous studies suggest that such attack might require significant
amount of poisonous instances [40]. For example, Steinhardt
et al. [54] shows that, with IMDB dataset, an attacker needs
to craft 3% of the total training instances to achieve 11% of
accuracy drop compared to the pristine model. Further, the
defenses based on robust outlier removal techniques could
render poison injection ineffective by filtering it out [14, 54].
Moreover, to achieve targeted damages without harming the
model’s overall accuracy, targeted poisoning attacks [49, 55]
have been studied. In this paper, we analyze a test-time vul-
nerability that does not require the adversary’s contact to the
victim model during its training. This vulnerability inflicts
indiscriminate damage, similar to indiscriminate poisoning
attacks, through a different attack medium.
Hardware fault injection attacks. Hardware fault injec-
tion is a class of attacks that rely on hardware glitches on
the system to corrupt victim’s data. These glitches gener-
ally provide a single-bit write primitive at the physical mem-
ory; which could potentially lead to privilege escalation [67].
While in the past these attacks required physical access to
the victim’s system [11, 38], recently they have gained more
momentum since the software-based version of these attacks
were demonstrated [26, 57]. Instances of these attacks are 1)
the CLKSCREW attack [57] that leverages dynamic voltage
and frequency scaling on mobile processors generate faults
on instructions; or 2) the well-known Rowhammer vulnerabil-
ity that triggers bitwise corruptions in DRAM. Rowhammer
has been used in the context of cloud VMs [44, 67], on desk-
tops [48] and mobile [62] and even to compromise browsers
from JavaScript [9, 15, 19]. In the context of DNNs, fault
attacks have been proposed as an alternative for inflicting
indiscriminate damages. Instead of injecting poisonous in-
stances, fault attacks directly induce perturbations to the mod-
els running on hardware [11, 13, 34, 38, 45]. These studies
have considered the adversaries with direct access to the vic-
tim hardware [11, 13] and adversaries who randomly corrupt
parameters [34, 38, 45]. We utilize Rowhammer as an estab-
lished fault attack to demonstrate practical implications of the
graceless degradation of DNNs. Our threat model follows the
realistic single bit-flip capability of a fault attack and modern
application of DNNs in a cloud environment, where physical
access to the hardware is impractical.
8 Conclusions
This work exposes the limits of DNN’s resilience against the
parameter perturbations. We study the vulnerability of DNN
models to single bit-flips. We evaluate 19 DNN models with
six architectures on three image classification tasks and esti-
mate that 40-50% of a DNN’s parameters are vulnerable. An
attacker, with only a single-bit corruption of these vulnerable
parameters, can cause indiscriminate damage [RAD> 0.1].
We further characterize this vulnerability based on the impact
of various factors: the bit position, bit-flip direction, parameter
sign, layer width, activation function, training techniques, and
model architecture. To demonstrate the feasibility of the bit-
flip attacks in practice, we leverage a software-induced fault
injection attack, Rowhammer. In experiments with Rowham-
mer, we find that, without knowing the victim’s deep learning
system, the attacker can inflict indiscriminate damage without
system crashes. Lastly, motivated by the attacks, we discuss
two potential directions of mitigation: restricting activation
magnitudes and using low-precision numbers. We believe that
our work is an important step for understanding and mitigat-
ing this emerging threat that can compromise the security of
critical deep learning systems.
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Appendix
A Network Architectures
We use 19 DNN models in our experiments: six architecture
and their variants. Table 7 describes two architectures and
their six variations for MNIST. For CIFAR10, we employ the
base architecture from [55] that has four convolutional layers
and a fully-connected layer, and we make three variations
of it. CIFAR10-AlexNet11 and CIFAR10-VGG1612 are from
the community. For ImageNet, we use the DNN architectures
available from the Internet13. In Sec 6.2, we employ two
networks (8-bit quantized14 and binarized versions of MNIST-
L5) from the community15 with adjustments.
B The Vulnerability Using Different Criteria
We examine the vulnerable parameter ratio (vulnerability)
using the different RAD criterion with 15 DNN models. Our
results are in Figure 11. Each figure describe the vulnera-
ble parameter ratio on a specific RAD criterion; for instance,
in MNIST-L5, the model has 40% of vulnerable parameters
that cause [RAD> 0.5], which estimates the upper bound of
the blind attacker. In MNIST, CIFAR10, and two ImageNet
models, the vulnerability decreases as the attacker aims to
inflict the severe damage; however, in ImageNet, ResNet50,
DenseNet161, and InceptionV3 have almost the same vulner-
ability (∼50%) with the high criterion [RAD> 0.8].
C Hyper-parameters for Training
In our experiments, we use these hyper-parameters:
• MNISTs. For MNIST models, we use: SGD, 40 epochs,
0.01 learning rate (lr), 64 batch, 0.1 momentum, and
adjust learning rate by 0.1, in every 10 epochs.
• CIFAR10s. For Base models we use: SGD, 50 epochs,
0.02 lr, 32 batch, 0.1 momentum, and adjust lr by 0.5,
in every 10 epochs. For AlexNet, we use: 300 epochs,
0.01 lr, 64 batch, 0.1 momentum, and adjust lr by 0.95,
in every 10 epochs. For VGG16, we use: 300 epochs,
0.01 lr, 128 batch, 0.1 momentum, and adjust lr by 0.15,
in every 100 epochs.
• GTSRB. We fine-tune VGG16 pre-trained on ImageNet,
using: SGD, 40 epochs, 0.01 lr, 32 batch, 0.1 momentum,
and adjust lr by 0.1 and 0.05, in 15 and 25 epochs. We
freeze the parameters of the first 10 layers.
• Flower102. We fine-tune ResNet50 pre-trained on Im-
ageNet, using: SGD, 40 epochs, 0.01 lr, 50 batch, 0.1
momentum, and adjust lr by 0.1, in 15 and 25 epochs.
We freeze the parameters of the first 10 layers.
.
11https://github.com/bearpaw/pytorch-classification/blob/master/
models/cifar/alexnet.py
12https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar/blob/master/models/vgg.
py
13https://github.com/pytorch/vision/tree/master/torchvision/models
14https://github.com/eladhoffer/quantized.pytorch
15https://github.com/jiecaoyu/XNOR-Net-PyTorch
Table 7: 8 Network Architectures for MNIST. We take the two baselines (Base and LeNet5) and make four and two variants
from them, respectively. Note that we highlight the variations from the baselines in red color.
Base Base (Wide) Base (Dropout) Base (PReLU)
Layer Type Layer Size Layer Type Layer Size Layer Type Layer Size Layer Type Layer Size
Conv (R) 5x5x10 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x20 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x10 (2) Conv (P) 5x5x10 (2)
Conv (R) 5x5x20 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x40 (2) Conv (-) 5x5x20 (2) Conv (P) 5x5x20 (2)
- - - - Dropout (R) 0.5 - -
FC (R) 50 FC (R) 100 FC (R) 50 FC (P) 50
- - - - Dropout (R) 0.5 - -
FC (S) 10 FC (S) 10 FC (S) 10 FC (S) 10
Base (D-BNorm) LeNet5 [33] LeNet5 (Dropout) LeNet5 (D-BNorm)
Layer Type Layer Size Layer Type Layer Size Layer Type Layer Size Layer Type Layer Size
Conv (-) 5x5x10 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x6 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x6 (2) Conv (-) 5x5x6 (2)
BatchNorm (R) 10 - - - - BatchNorm (R) 6
- - MaxPool (-) 2x2 MaxPool (-) 2x2 MaxPool (-) 2x2
Conv (-) 5x5x20 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x16 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x16 (2) Conv (-) 5x5x16 (2)
BatchNorm (R) 20 - - - - BatchNorm (R) 16
- - MaxPool (-) 2x2 MaxPool (-) 2x2 MaxPool (-) 2x2
- - Conv (R) 5x5x120 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x120 (2) Conv (R) 5x5x120 (2)
- - - - - - BatchNorm (R) 120
Dropout (R) 0.5 - - Dropout (R) 0.5 Dropout (R) 0.5
- - MaxPool (-) 2x2 MaxPool (-) 2x2 MaxPool (-) 2x2
- - Conv (R) 5x5x120 (1) Conv (R) 5x5x120 (1) Conv (R) 5x5x120 (1)
FC (R) 50 FC (R) 84 FC (R) 84 FC (R) 84
Dropout (R) 0.5 - - Dropout (R) 0.5 Dropout (R) 0.5
FC (S) 10 FC (S) 10 FC (S) 10 FC (S) 10
Figure 11: The vulnerability of 15 DNN models using different criteria. We plot the vulnerable parameter ratio based on the
different RADs that an attacker aims; 5 from MNIST (left), 5 from CIFAR10 (middle), and 5 from ImageNets (right).
